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Summary
In the era of Xi Jinping in China, the international profile of the country has risen. So 
too has its need to proactively spell out what its rise means to the rest of the world. 
This essay looks at the ways in which China has attempted to tell its story, and the 
challenges it has faced from a world that often knows little about it but also has strong, 
antipathetic opinions about its political system.
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1 Introduction
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a story to tell. We know that because 
this is something its leaders and the propaganda department of the Communist 
Party are repeatedly saying.1 In the past, in Maoist China (1949-1976) or China 
in the era of early reform in the 1980s, the country had either an ideology or 
a viewpoint it regarded as objectively true (broadly Marxism-Leninism as in-
terpreted by Mao Zedong) and which it wanted the world to understand, be 
converted to and then embrace.2 As with most of those in the business of pros-
elytising, there was no compromise or negotiation. But these days, China is 
talking in far softer words about the ‘China Dream’, the common destiny for 
1 Bandurski 2017.
2 Lovel 2019.
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mankind, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the idea of win-win — at 
least until the COVID-19 crisis disrupted things from the beginning of 2020 and 
made for a sharper situation. While the story it is telling might be particular 
to Chinese circumstances, it is structured in the same way as those being de-
ployed in Western democracies — ‘Make America Great Again’ in the United 
States or ‘Get Brexit Done’ in the United Kingdom in late 2019. It broadly fo-
cusses on national greatness, power and status. One of the most important 
differences to others is the teller of the story — the Chinese Party State and 
its complex network of agents. This is relatively new to this sort of activity in 
the international stage. And the message of this story is one that sits atop a 
complex set of other issues and, most strikingly of all, is being conveyed to a 
world that in many cases has little proper knowledge of China, its history, cul-
ture or circumstances, and that was divided, at least until 2020, about what to 
think of this new actor and what it is saying. That means that the China story is 
greeted by responses ranging from utter acceptance (Pakistan) to deep scepti-
cism (Europe) to outright hostility (the United States and India).
2 What Is the China Story?
First off, however, we have to ask a very basic question: What is the China 
story? Then, we have to move on to the question of how is it told, and why? 
In fact, to answer the first question, we need to be clear that the China story 
inside the PRC under Xi Jinping is one thing; the story as it is told to the out-
side world is another, even though the two are intimately connected. This gives 
the phenomenon an intrinsic complexity right from the start, and means it is 
worthwhile investing in the time to disaggregate them.3
Domestically, the China story has arisen from the whole narrative of 
Communist rule since the Party came to power in 1949. Teller of a liberation 
story in its early era, and associated with understanding China’s histories be-
fore the modern era as ones marked by feudalism, class struggle and exploita-
tion, the China story was always characterised in the telling by a strong, almost 
mystical sense of China as a kind of Great Ideal, an almost spiritual entity that 
lay at the heart of nationalism right from the start of the 20th century. While it 
predated him, this story appeared strongly in the works of Mao, and has been 
duplicated by his successors, despite their significant differences from him in 
other areas of politics and polity. In this narrative of nationalism, the most 
striking feature is the ways that China figures as the victim in modern history, 
3 Brown 2018, 45-46.
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one which is now finally marching towards its liberation and renaissance. 
The sense of China’s rectification and its receiving justice being imminent 
was, and remains, a huge mobilising message for Chinese people, whatever 
their individual views of the Communist Party delivering this might be. In a 
sense, it served as the Party’s trump card, despite the many serious mistakes 
it made during its era in power, from the Great Leap Forward of 1958 to the 
terrible famines of the early 1960s and the Cultural Revolution from 1966. In 
the Party’s historiography, these were venal sins compared to the sole cardinal 
sin — betraying the national interest — something the Party has sworn it will 
never do.
By the 1990s, despite the economic, social and diplomatic changes made 
by the country after the 1978 reforms of the leadership around Deng Xiaoping 
following the death of Mao two years earlier, this underpinning sense of na-
tionalism as the core message for the Party was compounded by the wave of 
patriotic education campaigns waged in the country.4 Insecurity from the 1989 
Tiananmen Square massacre and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, along 
with divisions about the speed and scale of reform in the Party itself, meant 
that stressing the need to ‘love China’ became a great unifying slogan and sen-
timent. Questions about what the concept of China at the heart of this might 
be and any divisions there were unwelcome. There was a great, ancient, uni-
fied entity called China, the Party State’s arguments went, that needed to be 
renewed and restored to its central role in the world after the indignities it had 
suffered at the hands of others in modern history. That was all that need to be 
said on the matter. This was China’s destiny. More importantly, it delivered on 
the mission of the Party itself, with its teleological and positive view of his-
tory drawn from Marxist dialectics. China’s rise was inevitable, scientifically 
ensured by the logic of Marxism-Leninism. It was unavoidable. Those who op-
posed it within the country were simply fighting against the inevitable. This 
mindset has persisted to this day. The sole difference is that it has been com-
pounded by the continuing economic success of the country, and by the suc-
cessful sustainability of the Party’s monopoly on power.
This domestic story has its own dynamic. It is crucial for the legitimacy of 
the Party, and for its public communication strategy with a population that 
is untouched and unmoved by the gritty details of Marxism-Leninism but 
can be reached through less dogmatic appeals to the strong powerful nation 
narrative.5 The self-same story facing outwards has a different dynamic be-
cause of the non-Chinese cultural and political context it needs to be told in. 
4 Callahan 2009, 31-61.
5 Perry 2017, 29-51.
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This is where the China Dream converted from the country rising and being 
strong and powerful again to the more conciliatory idea of ‘win-win’ and ‘com-
mon destiny’, phrases that occur so often in Chinese external propaganda and 
publicity material now. This is associated particularly with the Belt and Road 
Initiative, the key foreign policy idea of Xi from 2013. The main objectives of 
this storytelling are twofold — to ensure that China has a geopolitical space 
that is rightfully its own, and which recognises its return to global primacy, but 
also to reassure the world that this is a process which will work out to every-
one’s benefit. This is a mixture of the assertive (the former) and the placatory 
(the latter).6
3 Xi Jinping and Telling the Story
Xi’s stress on the importance of telling this China global story has been a strik-
ing feature of his leadership right from the earliest months after his elevation 
to Party Secretary in November 2012. The previous Hu Jintao era (2002-2012) 
had been one of phenomenal growth. In the decade following China’s entry to 
the World Trade Organization in 2001, the economy quadrupled. This was the 
era of the great enrichment. But it had not been accompanied by a strengthen-
ing of the country’s international narrative. This decade can now be seen as 
one of a silent China — the time when the world’s third-, and then from 2010 
second-largest economy acted more like a mouse than a dragon. The reticence 
of China was best represented by the wooden, technocratic language of Hu 
himself, barren on personal references and any attempt to enliven and excite 
his audience, despite the extraordinary things going on around him.7
In early 2013, Xi commanded the country’s leaders, its media and public 
and its diplomatic service to ‘tell the China story’ and to do so proactively. The 
‘China Dream’ slogan was the main means of doing this — a dream that was 
presented as one that everyone inside and outside of the country could share.8 
China’s economy was a global benefit and a common source for enrichment 
and development in this story. It was a benign and positive thing, not a cause 
of anxiety, threat and challenges. While the language and tone of nationalism 
within China often sounded shrill and assertive, outside the country it was 
6 Brown 2017, 201-216.
7 Brown 2012, 154.
8 Xi 2014.
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more friendly. China, as Xi said when speaking in France in 2014, was a ‘lovely 
friendly lion’.9 There was nothing to worry about.
Despite these consoling words, a new player with such a different historic 
background, one with a wholly different political model and one whose ap-
pearance to international prominence had been so sudden was always going 
to present issues. After all, even in the 1980s and 1990s, China was a relatively 
marginal actor. Its explosive growth in the 21st century presented as many 
problems for it as for the world outside in terms of working out what the 
meaning of its rise meant, and what might happen next. The story was simply 
a framework to try to keep control of a potentially uncontrollable situation. 
But every story needs to have someone telling that story, and it was the issue of 
who was telling this new story in the Chinese case that presented some of the 
sharpest challenges.
First, the teller was largely a particular political entity — the Communist 
Party of China. It was the one that created and dominated the rendition of 
the domestic narrative, and therefore by definition was at the heart of the 
outward telling too. Even if, as it sometimes tried to, the Party spoke through 
various proxies and different agents it was addressing a world which over-
whelmingly did not share its political values. No amount of finessing and 
obfuscation could conceal this. The audience was in the country’s chief mar-
kets in Europe, the United States and the rest of the liberal multi-democratic 
world, along with partners who may not have been democracies but were cer-
tainly not communist in Latin America, Africa and Central Asia. Had China 
at least shared some common political ground with the world around it, an 
already challenging situation of a new power rising to the top of global in-
fluence may have been easier to navigate. As it was, China was doing some-
thing intrinsically disruptive, with a noticeably different system and view of 
the world.
Because of the teller of the story was such an exceptional entity, a good part 
of what China’s core message might be was off limits. China could not assume 
a common values system or a common set of aspirations in the political realm 
to the external audience it was talking to. Even if it did want to replace the 
global order rotating around the United States with one focussed on China, it 
would have required a massive act of persuasion and knowledge dissemina-
tion. As it was, it seems more accurate to describe China’s task as a nation as 
simply acquiring a specific international space for itself where at least others 
granted it the benefit of the doubt and saw it as in their self-interest to not try 
to have conflicts with it. That meant that the China story externally was framed 
9 MOFA 2014.
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in a way that appealed to this self-interest, and in that way assumed an almost 
mercenary, materialistic tone. It focussed on the part of the overall China nar-
rative that everyone was likely to appreciate and be interested in — economic 
benefits and getting rich together.
4 Challenges on Telling the Story outside China
This helps to explain something about the structure of the story that China 
tells globally. Whatever appeals to idealism and ideals there might be are 
mostly so abstract as to be almost meaningless — slogans about common hu-
manity, common destiny, a global happy future. There are few, if any, appeals 
to specific political values like Chinese collectivism or its notions of stability 
at all costs, largely because these would not be considered attractive outside 
the Chinese context. While Xi had talked a little about the notion of a China 
model of governance that combined high economic growth with social stabil-
ity which others might want to emulate from 2017, the idea remains a vague, 
undeveloped one.10 China, it seems, wants tolerance for itself, not the adop-
tion of its unique, very Sinocentric system by others. Instead, the subliminal 
message in this iteration of the China Dream is that all live on one planet, all 
must all be tolerant of each other’s values, living and letting live is the best phi-
losophy, and if the world achieves that it can then focus on achieving the main 
shared thing — getting materially richer and better off.
This sort of story has a simplicity, and can appeal to a wide constituency 
who, in fact, do just want to get better off. For this group, China’s immense 
economy is incentivising, both as a template for what they might do to enrich 
themselves and as a target where they can trade and invest and make benefits 
for themselves. That gives the story a sometimes almost transactional qual-
ity. It is about win-win, about everyone coming out with something, about 
standard, demotic processes such as buying and selling things, putting more 
money in the bank, being able to afford things that once were far out of reach. 
Everyone is getting richer and better off. What’s not to like?
The optimism of this story is one of its chief sources of power and appeal. 
So, too, is the way that it keys into the priority for most responsible govern-
ments to try to make the people they govern better off. The great challenge, 
however, is that the story’s simplicity and limitations lead to questions being 
raised about it. Is it true that the Chinese government is so benign it just wants 
a happy ending for everyone, people might ask? Could it be that this conceals a 
10  Xi 2017a, 543-553.
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far deeper, larger ambition — to see a world made soporific and unsuspecting 
through the money flowing into it that, before it knows it, it finds itself under 
a Chinese hegemony that has just appeared? This hegemony, because of the 
values issues referred to above, would be an enforced one. Like frogs being 
boiled in water, the more pessimistic predict that the world is being lulled into 
a sense of false security by a China story promising only wealth and prosperity 
and happiness but actually silently constructing servitude. When challenged 
about why they have such negative thoughts, critics simple come back with the 
retort: ‘Don’t be misled by the story. Look at the storyteller’.
5 The Belt and Road Initiative
There are two case studies that represent the challenges. The first is the Belt 
and Road Initiative mentioned above. This typifies many of the problems of 
Chinese story telling in the current era under Xi. The BRI originally appeared 
in 2013 as a New Silk Road, and then became One Belt and One Road before 
settling into the current moniker. The BRI is a bold idea, one that typifies the 
proactive language and nature of diplomacy and communication under Xi. It 
seeks to achieve a number of goals. First, it conveys to the Asian region the pos-
itive role that China can play as a trade partner, potential investor and builder 
of infrastructure. This leverages on the country’s own wide experience in this 
area. China as a supplier of high-speed rail, of dams and of other critical infra-
structure makes sense because it has a good track record of doing this success-
fully in its own environment.11
Second, the BRI uses the benign issue of economics to stake out its own 
rightful international space. With no straightforward political or security 
strand, the BRI can at least create a zone of Chinese influence in a way that the 
United States cannot easily contest. As the world’s second-largest economy, 
China feels that it has its own legitimate zone, and that it should not live in one 
constrained by the United States and its massive alliance system. At the same 
time, it does not want to antagonise the world’s sole remaining military super-
power. It utilises this narrow area of economics to create a Sinosphere. Even 
with this, however, it has received suspicion and criticism. But it has achieved 
at least some successes.
Third, the BRI figures not as a story told by one actor but as one to which 
many others can contribute different narrative threads and chapters. No 
implementing agency with sole responsibility over the BRI has been set up 
11  Xi 2017b.
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in Beijing. There are many people able to take parts of the story out into the 
wider world — state enterprises, private businesspeople, local government. 
They speak to diverse audiences, in a non-normative, non-prescriptive way, en-
couraging them through dialogue to make their own bespoken version of the 
grand narrative being unfolded. The BRI has therefore fragmented into many 
different parts, varying in the ways in which it is told dependent on if this is in 
Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia or Central and Eastern Europe.
These various aspects of the BRI are sources of strength but also of prob-
lems. They show well the real challenges of Chinese Party State storytelling as 
it migrates across the borders of the country into the outside world. So much 
of who, how and why stories told in China can be controlled by the Party. 
But in the wider world, of course, these disappear. Then, it becomes a case of 
reaching different audiences with varying levels of enthusiasm and scepticism. 
For some, as already stated, the fact that the BRI is only about the economics 
strikes them as unfeasible and emotionally unsatisfying. It seems like they are 
being exposed to a story where they want romance and mystery and all they 
get is a simple causative narrative which offers little to the imagination.
For others, the epic scope of the idea typifies the story of the command 
economy planning, monolithic nature of Communist politics. It is almost pre-
modern in its tone. In an era in which the local has made a strong return, and 
where great processes of globalisation make people nervous, the BRI is seen as 
too epic and dramatic. It is almost inhuman in its scale.12
COVID-19 from 2020 has brought many of these issues of China’s image, and 
its story, to the forefront. The likely origination of the pandemic in Wuhan, 
China, means that as it spread across the rest of the world, the country started 
to figure in people’s daily lives and influence in ways that had never before 
been so explicit and visible. Suddenly, politicians, commentators and mem-
bers of the public all acquired a need to know what they thought about China. 
Many in the United States and Europe became decidedly more negative. The 
problematisation of the country intensified. Its own diplomacy was exposed, 
through the phenomenon of wolf warriors, as being shrill, assertive and defen-
sive. Above all, COVID-19 showed that a country with a huge economy, inter-
linked into the global supply chain and able to influence debates from climate 
change to public health to international economic development, when it had 
the sort of political model China did created often highly divided and some-
times unambiguously hostile responses. The issue here was not that people 
were not listening; it was that they were listening, and deeply disliked what 
they were hearing and who was speaking to them.13
12  Hornby and Zhang 2019.
13  Brown and Wang 2020.
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6 Conclusion
The China story is one that needs to be told, despite all these challenges. That 
is unavoidable. The aspirations and interests of a fifth of humanity cannot be 
ignored or discounted, even when an issue as difficult as a global pandemic oc-
curs. This is regardless of the political system that China lives under. No matter 
what, there will, therefore, be a China story. The way in which that story is told 
and who takes the lead in telling it will continue to pose problems. Chinese nar-
ratives come from a different cultural context. This is true of anywhere. They 
are told in a way which is often at variance with the way stories are told in, for 
instance, Europe and the United States, with their love of strong climaxes and 
clear narrative direction. Anyone who has read one of the great Chinese clas-
sic novels, Dream of the Red Chamber by Cao Xueqin from the 18th century,14 
will know the sprawling, often difficult shape of Chinese tales. Despite this, 
Chinese people are like people anywhere. They enjoy stories. But like people 
anywhere, the way those stories are told is often conditioned by cultural norms 
and traditions.
On the question of who tells the story beside the Chinese state, there can 
be some flexibility. Chinese students, tourists, businesspeople, artistic figures 
and the public can all take part in this grand act of storytelling and contribute 
their own specific narratives. In some ways, the more this happens, the more 
the story becomes human, and the more palatable it is likely to be outside of 
China’s borders. But the commanding role of the state in this great act of sto-
rytelling is also, until such a time as China’s political system changes, unlikely 
to change. The best thing is for people, wherever they are, to accept, and then 
seek out, these other voices coming from China, and not just be preoccupied 
with the dominant one. The voices are there, if one is willing to listen.
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